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I. INTRODUCTION: THE BINARY & THE INTERSEX  
 A joyful mother announces, “It’s a boy!” at her baby’s “gender 
reveal” party as blue balloons fill the room.  And suddenly, the “it” 
becomes human.  Our gender makes us worthy of a pronoun. Without 
gender do we really exist?  In a society where gender is the most 
relevant category, it can be hard to imagine where a genderless 
individual would fit in society.  As Judith Butler explains, individuals 
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who do not fit into the binary frame of gender identity, male or female, 
are disconcerting to society because they have the perceived effect of 
destabilizing the “coherence and continuity among sex, gender, sexual 
practice, and desire.”1  It is no wonder then, that those children born 
intersex or with ambiguous genitalia are treated as requiring 
immediate medical intervention—as something that needs to be 
“corrected.”2  A child born without a gender is analogous to an 
individual without a State—the very documents conferring citizenship 
require an affirmative “male” or “female” designation.3  
 This Article considers the interests at stake in the decision to 
subject a child to “corrective” intersex surgery by weighing the 
benefits of allowing the surgery against the potential violation of a 
child’s fundamental rights.  Given the nature of the interests involved, 
only constitutional safeguards provide sufficient protection for intersex 
children.  Part I provides a working definition of intersex and briefly 
outlines past and current medical discourse.  Because this Article deals 
with constitutional rights, the Fourteenth Amendment in particular, 
Part II explicates State action in the intersex context, suggesting that 
the State should be involved as a third-party arbiter.  Part III explores 
the constitutional rights of intersex children and their parents by 
weighing each right against relevant State interests.  Part IV concludes 
with the recommendation that, before any medical action is taken, a 
neutral party should consider all of these competing interests in order 
to ensure every decision is grounded in fundamental constitutional 
norms.  
II.  PART I: DEFINING INTERSEX  
According to the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA), 
“‘Intersex’ is a general term used for a variety of conditions in which a 
person is born with a reproductive or sexual anatomy that does not 
                                                
 
* J.D. Candidate 2016, Florida State University College of Law. My thanks to 
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1 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 
23 (1990).  
2 Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect 
Intersex Infants, 21 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 59, 83 (2006) (“Only in a 
society in which sex is understood in binary terms (everyone is either male or 
female) does the hermaphroditic body become abnormal. Rather than 
conceptualizing such individuals as . . . occupying various points along a sex 
continuum, our society chooses to see them as suffering abnormalities that require 
repair.”).  
3 Jo Bird, Outside the Law: Intersex, Medicine and the Discourse of Rights, 12 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 65, 68 (2005).  
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seem to fit the typical definitions of female or male.”4  A number of 
conditions are classified as “intersex.”  For example, an intersex infant 
may have “normal” male genitalia and female hormones,5 or the 
intersex infant may be born with ambiguous genitalia and XY 
chromosomes.6  Globally, while some scholars suggest that between 
1.7% and 4% of individuals experience some degree of intersexuality,7 
other scholars estimate that merely 0.08% of infants are potentially 
subjected to genital “normalization” surgery each year.8 
What to do about intersexuality, or whether anything should be 
done at all, remains controversial in the medical and legal 
communities.  Historically, intersexuality was considered to be a 
medical emergency, and “treatment” for the condition was founded on 
a nurture-based theory of gender identity.9  Under this theory, “a child 
who has normative-looking genitals from a very early age, and is 
raised ‘unambiguously’ in the gender that matches those genitals, will 
develop the desired gender identity regardless of chromosome pattern, 
body structure at birth, or hormone exposure in the womb.”10  As such, 
sex was primarily assigned based on the infant’s external genitalia and 
the best possible surgical outcome for “normal” genitalia.11  
In 2006, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) endorsed 
revised guidelines that outlined the best practices for intersex clinical 
management and suggested a number of factors that should influence 
gender assignment:  
Optimal clinical management of individuals 
with DSD [disorders of sexual development] 
                                                
 
4 What is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOCIETY OF NORTH AMERICA, 
http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).  
5 Kate Haas, Who Will Make Room for the Intersexed?, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 43 
(2004). 
6 Sara A. Aliabadi, Gender Assignment Surgery for Intersexed Infants: How the 
Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy Both Supports and Opposes a 
Moratorium, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 170, 173 (2004). 
7 Benjamin Sweeney, The Cobblestones of Good Intentions: Substantive Due 
Process and Infant Genital Normalizing Surgery, 13 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 153, 162 
(2014). 
8 Laura D. Hermer, A Moratorium on Intersex Surgeries?: Law, Science, Identity, 
and Bioethics at the Crossroads, 13 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 255, 260 (2007).  
9 Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: 
Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants with Ambiguous 
Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3 (2000). 
10 Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 64.  
11 Id. at 66-67 (“A ‘positive surgical outcome’ for a male-assigned baby is a penis 
that is capable of penetration at maturity, and that can be used to urinate from a 
standing position; a ‘positive surgical outcome’ for a female-assigned baby is a 
vagina that can be penetrated by a penis.” (citation omitted)).  
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should comprise the following: (1) gender 
assignment must be avoided before expert 
evaluation in newborns; (2) evaluation and long-
term management must be performed at a center 
with an experienced multidisciplinary team; (3) 
all individuals should receive a gender 
assignment; (4) open communication with 
patients and families is essential, and 
participation in decision-making is encouraged; 
and (5) patient and family concerns should be 
respected and addressed in strict confidence.”12  
 
Gender assignment should be expedited because “[i]nitial 
gender uncertainty is unsettling and stressful for families,” and factors 
to be considered “include diagnosis, genital appearance, surgical 
options, need for lifelong replacement therapy, potential for fertility, 
views of the family, and, sometimes, circumstances relating to cultural 
practices.”13  The guidelines make plain that “[e]mphasis is on 
functional outcome rather than a strictly cosmetic appearance.”14 
However, the authors note that “[i]t is generally felt that surgery that is 
performed for cosmetic reasons in the first year of life relieves parental 
distress and improves attachment between the child and the parents.”15 
While the AAP-endorsed guidelines recognize the complex interplay 
of sex, gender, and society, it is evident that remnants of historical 
practices permeate the current medical dialogue because non-
medically necessary “corrective” intersex surgeries are still being 
performed.16  Moreover, it is important to remember that these are 
guidelines and not necessarily an indication of modern practice.17  
 Contrary to the AAP-endorsed guidelines, some intersex 
advocates have demanded that there be a moratorium on all non-
                                                
 
12 Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 
118 PEDIATRICS 488, 490 (2006).  
13 Id. at 491.  
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 See, e.g., M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143, 145 (4th Cir. 
2015). 
17 As the ISNA points out, “[A]s wonderful and historic as these changes are, no 
institution has fully implemented them. There are no mechanisms . . . in place to 
foster implementation nor to evaluate to what extent these changes improve health 
care experiences and outcomes for persons and families affected by DSDs.” Dear 
ISNA Friends and Supporters, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., 
http://www.isna.org/farewell_message (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).  
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medically necessary surgery for intersex infants.18  Moratorium 
advocates point to factors such as the number of complications faced 
by individuals who received “corrective” intersex surgery.19  
According to some studies, the average number of surgeries an 
intersex child undergoes is between three and five.20  Individuals who 
were subjected to the procedure recount “repeated surgeries 
throughout childhood, limited or absent sexual response, painful and 
scarred genitals, a sense of shame stemming from repeated and 
unexplained medical examinations of their genitals, infertility, 
difficulty forming relationships, and depression.”21 Another study 
reveals that many intersex individuals would not have chosen the 
surgery for themselves and “express regret and anger that surgery was 
imposed on them as children.”22  Some scholars go as far as comparing 
non-medically necessary surgery performed on children born intersex 
to female genital mutilation and suggest that “corrective” intersex 
surgery, too, should be prohibited by statute.23 Proponents of the 
                                                
 
18 Interestingly, there is a consensus that all children should be assigned a gender—
the controversy stems only from the role of surgical intervention. See April Herndon, 
Why Doesn’t ISNA Want to Eradicate Gender?, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM. (Feb. 17, 
2006, 1:28 PM), http://www.isna.org/faq/not_eradicating_gender.  
19 See Aliabadi, supra note 6, at 177 (“Numerous reports describe intersexed 
individuals who were assigned as females, and later declared themselves male. In 
addition to rejecting their assigned gender in adulthood, surgically-assigned 
intersexed individuals also can experience loss of sexual sensation, loss of sexual 
function, loss of reproductive potential, and physical pain during sexual activity.”); 
Samantha S. Uslan, Note, What Parents Don’t Know: Informed Consent, Marriage, 
and Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersex Children, 85 IND. L.J. 301, 303 (2010). 
20 Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and 
the Selective Condemnation of “Cultural Practices,” 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71, 
105 (2005); Kishka-Kamari Ford, “First, Do Not Harm” – The Fiction of Legal 
Parental Consent to Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 19 YALE L. 
& POL’Y REV. 469, 476 (2001) (“Despite the fact that intersexuality is not a life-
threatening disorder, medical professionals have continued to treat it as an 
emergency by focusing not on the physical dangers of ambiguous genitalia but on the 
psychosocial problem of intersexuality.”). 
21 Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 61.  
22 Ford, supra note 20, at 485.  
23 Darra L. Clark Hofman, Male, Female, and Other: How Science, Medicine and 
Law Treat the Intersexed, and the Implications for Sex-Dependent Law, 21 TUL. J.L. 
& SEXUALITY 1, 9-10 (2012) (“Clitoridectomies, performed to make the child’s 
genitals cosmetically pleasing, have the same effect on Western intersexed children 
that they do on African girls—loss of sexual function and sensation, loss of ability to 
achieve orgasm, and psychological trauma. The difference between the two is in the 
discourse, not the surgery. We have orientalized clitoridectomies performed on 
African girls as a sexist, barbaric practice, often called ‘female genital mutilation,’ 
while reassuring ourselves that sex-assignment surgery on Western intersexed 
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surgery often counter such assertions by pointing to the successes of 
gender assignment surgery, the importance of protecting a child’s 
psychosocial health, and respecting parental decision-making.24  
In sum, although the discourse has evolved to include more 
nuanced positions on gender and sexuality, there is no consensus about 
how society should react to intersexuality.  While this Article does not 
propose a definite course of action, it does provide a constitutional 
framework for balancing the interests of children, parents, and the 
State to serve as guideposts for making medical decisions.  
 
III.  PART II: FINDING STATE ACTION IN THE INTERSEX CONTEXT  
 Common law protections are generally insufficient to prevent 
“corrective” intersex surgery from being performed on children. A 
common law standard, in which the court considers whether parental 
action constitutes abuse or neglect, is problematic for several 
reasons.25  First, the standard only considers whether a minimal level 
of acceptable conduct has been met.26  In the intersex context, 
however, the conduct at issue is not so simple—instead, parents must 
make difficult decisions in areas where social consensus is lacking.27 
Second, the standard is too amorphous and lacks clear guiding 
principles regarding when judicial deference to parental decisions is 
appropriate.28  For these reasons, a family court is unlikely to rule 
against the professional medical opinion recommending surgery, 
especially when given in conjunction with the parents’ wishes.  
Instead, invoking constitutional rights adequately protects the 
interests of the child. Instead of searching for a minimal level of 
acceptable conduct, courts applying constitutional principles will apply 
a more searching inquiry—ensuring that the State does not unduly 
infringe upon certain individual rights. For an individual to be afforded 
constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, there must be State action.  The Due Process 
Clause “offers no shield” against private conduct, “however wrongful 
or discriminatory.”29  There must be “a sufficiently close nexus 
                                                                                                               
 
children is a scientific procedure, neutral and civilized because it makes intersexed 
children ‘normal.’”); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 116 (West 2013). 
24 Aliabadi, supra note 6, at 178 (describing arguments in favor of intersex surgery).  
25 Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents Should 
Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73 TEMP. 
L. REV. 1, 2 (2000). 
26 Id. 
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 2-3. 
29 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974). 
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between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so 
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State 
itself.”30  
In a small number of scenarios, State action will be apparent. 
For example, when a State has legal custody of the intersex child or 
when a State hospital board approves gender assignment surgery, there 
is little question about whether the State has acted.31  However, the 
vast majority of cases will involve private action. Some scholars 
suggest that State action is implicated by the very nature of the family-
State relationship.32  Under this theory, a parent, in the legal sense, is a 
creature of common law, statute, and constitutional protections.33 
Furthermore, because parental custody and control is subject to State 
regulation and judicial enforcement, the State is, in some sense, always 
acting.34  As such, discussing State action in terms of intervention or 
nonintervention is an incoherent concept in the family law context.35  
While an enticing theory, the argument that State action is 
inherent in the parent-child relationship would conceivably invite 
constitutional law into every aspect of private life.  There are many 
areas of the law in which the State ensures or enforces rights—such as 
private property and contracts—but extending constitutional 
protections to entirely private actions in these areas may raise concerns 
about government over-intrusiveness. 
Furthermore, the argument that State action is implicated by 
the nature of the parent-child relationship is not supported by case law. 
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the U.S. Supreme Court promulgated a broader 
view of the State action doctrine, holding that judicial enforcement of 
a private agreement constituted State action and, thus, implicated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 The Court 
stated:  
These are not cases . . . in which the States have 
merely abstained from action, leaving private 
individuals free to impose such discriminations 
as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which 
                                                
 
30 Id. at 351.  
31 See M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143, 146 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(involving a State actor authorizing gender assignment surgery on infant M.C.). 
32 B. Jessie Hill, Constituting Children’s Bodily Integrity, 64 DUKE L.J. 1295, 1338 
(2015). 
33 Id.  
34 Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 835, 835-37 (1985) (“[T]he state is deeply implicated in the formation and 
functioning of families . . . .”). 
35 Id.  
36 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). 
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the States have made available to such 
individuals the full coercive power of 
government to deny to petitioners, on the 
grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of 
property rights.37  
 
Similarly, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Court stated:  
By its inaction . . . the State[] has not only made 
itself a party . . . but has elected to place its 
power, property and prestige behind the 
admitted discrimination. The State has so far 
insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence . . . as a joint participant in the 
challenged activity, which, on that account, 
cannot be considered to have been so “purely 
private” as to fall without the scope of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.38   
 
These cases, enunciating the entanglement exception doctrine, 
seem to support a more expansive view of State action doctrine—
however, such holdings have been strictly limited to racial 
discrimination.  Indeed, the Supreme Court ruled out such an 
expansive view in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social 
Services, holding that the State is not constitutionally liable for failing 
to intervene to protect a child from his abusive father.39  
In order to warrant Fourteenth Amendment protections for 
intersex children, State action must be more explicit.  This can be 
accomplished in a number of ways, but the surest way to preemptively 
protect an intersex child’s fundamental rights is to require the State to 
serve as a neutral third-party arbiter, thus forcing the State into an 
affirmative relationship with the child.  Unlike DeShaney, where the 
harm suffered by the child was only indirectly related to the State,40 
the action allowing (or disallowing) intersex surgery would be directly 
attributable to the State. Practically, each State would need to require 
medical facilities to submit any case involving a child born with 
ambiguous genitalia to the State review board, prior to any medical 
intervention.  The State, acting through the neutral arbiter, would 
ultimately decide whether or not medical treatment is appropriate. For 
                                                
 
37 Id.  
38 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).  
39 489 U.S. 189, 202 (1989). 
40 Id. at 203. 
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reasons discussed below, such requirements are not unprecedented. In 
fact, most jurisdictions require parents to seek judicial authorization 
before sterilizing their child—regardless of whether or not the parents 
and doctors are in agreement.41  This is normatively beneficial because 
it ensures the best interests of the child are taken into consideration. 
Even more importantly, this requirement guarantees that the child will 
receive fundamental right protections both ex ante and ex post.  First, 
before taking any action, the court or neutral arbiter will be cognizant 
of the constitutional implications when reaching a conclusion.  
Second, a child may potentially have a legal remedy if it can be proven 
that he or she was not afforded adequate due process.  
 
IV.  PART III: BALANCING INTERESTS  
In order to assess the different interests at stake in the 
“corrective” intersex surgery context, a four-step fundamental rights 
analysis must be applied. First, it must be determined whether the right 
at issue is fundamental.42  A right is fundamental when it is deeply 
rooted in history and tradition and is implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.43 History and tradition, however, are not the “outer 
boundaries” of the fundamental rights analysis.44  Instead, “[w]hen 
new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central 
protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be 
addressed.”45 How specific the right is defined is also critical to this 
analysis.46 Second, it must be determined whether the State has 
infringed upon that fundamental right.47  The State’s infringement 
must be substantial.48 Third, it must be determined whether the State 
has a sufficient justification for the infringement.49  Fourth, and 
relatedly, it must be determined whether the State’s means are 
sufficiently related to the purpose.50  For fundamental rights, the Court 
typically applies a strict scrutiny analysis, which requires that the 
                                                
 
41 Uslan, supra note 19, at 310.  
42 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997). 
43 Id. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (recognizing that this 
Nation’s history and tradition “show an emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives 
in matters pertaining to sex”).  
44 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015). 
45 Id. 
46 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (“[W]e have required in substantive-due-process 
cases a ‘careful description’ of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”).  
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 766-67 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
49 Id. at 721. 
50 Id. 
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State’s interest be compelling and the means be narrowly-tailored to 
that interest.51   
While there is no question that children possess certain 
fundamental constitutional rights,52 there is ambiguity about what 
those rights are and what constitutes a constitutional infringement. 
Oftentimes, a child’s rights are balanced against the constitutional 
rights of his or her parents and the interests of the State.53  Part III 
applies the fundamental rights framework to the intersex surgery 
context.  First, Part III looks at whether “corrective” intersex surgery 
implicates a child’s fundamental rights. Second, it examines parental 
fundamental rights.  Finally, it concludes by looking at the State’s 
competing interests—respecting parental rights and protecting the 
child’s—and considering possible means for the State to effectuate its 
goals.  
A. The Child’s Fundamental Rights  
 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “[no] State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”54 The Due Process Clause 
contains “a substantive component as well, one ‘barring certain 
government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to 
implement them.’”55 The Supreme Court defines substantive 
fundamental liberty rights broadly: “At the heart of liberty is the right 
to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
                                                
 
51 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
52 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) 
(“[Children] in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ under our Constitution. 
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they 
themselves must respect their obligations to the State.”); see also Skylar Curtis, 
Reproductive Organs and Differences of Sex Development: The Constitutional Issues 
Created by the Surgical Treatment of Intersex Children, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 841, 
852 (2011) (“The Supreme Court has recognized that children have full 
constitutional rights that co-exist with parental rights. However, parents sometimes 
exercise these constitutionally-protected rights on their child’s behalf, particularly 
those rights that relate to their ability to consent to or decline medical treatment.”). 
53 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (“[W]hether respondent’s 
constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty 
interests against the relevant state interests.”). Despite implicating a fundamental 
right against bodily intrusions, the Court rarely applies strict scrutiny in this context. 
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Constitutionality of Government-Imposed Bodily 
Intrusions, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1059, 1069 (2014). Instead, the Court utilizes a 
simple balancing test and weighs all relevant interests. Id.  
54 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
55 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (citing Daniels 
v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).  
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and of the mystery of human life.”56 The breadth of liberty protections 
afforded to adults is often limited for children. When a parent’s 
fundamental rights come into conflict with his or her child’s, the 
parent’s rights will prevail in most circumstances.57 For example, the 
Court has held that a child has a substantial liberty interest in not being 
subjected to unnecessary medical treatment, but, in the same breath, it 
also recognized a parent’s constitutional right to make medical 
decisions for his or her child absent a finding of neglect or abuse.58  
Crucial to this inquiry is how the fundamental right is defined. 
If defined narrowly, the right has very little probability of receiving 
protection. For example, courts are unlikely to recognize the 
fundamental right to live with ambiguous genitalia or the right to live 
as an intersex person.59  Instead, the right must be defined in a way 
that closely resembles traditional notions of fundamental rights. 
Moreover, there must be a substantial infringement.  The harms must 
be significant enough to trigger Due Process concerns. This Section of 
the article examines two fundamental liberty rights recognized by the 
Supreme Court—the right to bodily integrity and the right to 
procreate—as applied to children and how “corrective” intersex 
surgery has the potential to substantially interfere with each.  
 
i.  Bodily Integrity  
The right to bodily integrity is perhaps one of the oldest and 
most ingrained traditions of our law.60 “Because our notions of liberty 
are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-
determination, the Court has often deemed State incursions into the 
body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process 
                                                
 
56 Id. at 851. 
57 See Hill, supra note 32, at 1312-13 (“An exception to the model of broad parental 
discretion exists only in those cases in which there is a strong likelihood of the parent 
confronting a conflict of interests—for example, when a parent seeks to permit a 
child to donate an organ or tissue to a sibling.”).  
58 Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979).  
59 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 126 (1989) (“What Michael asserts 
here is a right to have himself declared the natural father and thereby to obtain 
parental prerogatives. What he must establish, therefore, is not that our society has 
traditionally allowed a natural father in his circumstances to establish paternity, but 
that it has traditionally accorded such a father parental rights, or at least has not 
traditionally denied them.” (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)). 
60 Mary Koll, Note, Growth, Interrupted: Nontherapeutic Growth Attenuation, 
Parental Medical Decision Making, and the Profoundly Developmentally Disabled 
Child’s Right to Bodily Integrity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 225, 236 (2010).  
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Clause.”61 Moreover, it is relatively uncontroversial that a child’s 
liberty interest encompasses the right to be free from arbitrary bodily 
invasion.62  Critical to this inquiry is that the bodily invasion is 
arbitrary, thus, medically necessary surgery would not be 
unconstitutional.63  Courts have found violations of a child’s right to 
bodily integrity primarily in the school and juvenile-detention 
contexts, where there is excessive corporal punishment or sexual abuse 
by a State actor.64 In the private sphere, courts have been reluctant to 
extend such rights.  For example, in Deshaney, the Supreme Court 
held that the Due Process Clause does not protect children from 
parental abuse.65  However, lower courts have upheld the right to 
bodily integrity when private actors attempt to subject mature minors 
to unwanted medical treatment.66 
As case law suggests, a minor’s right to bodily integrity is not 
absolute. In the abortion and contraception context, however, the Court 
has consistently recognized the right as one not subject to parental 
interference.  For example, in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth, the Court invalidated parental consent 
requirements for minors seeking abortions, holding that “the State does 
not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, 
and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his 
patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason 
for withholding the consent.”67  Similarly, in Carey v. Population 
Services International, the Court, relying on Danforth, suggested that a 
minor’s right to contraceptives was equal in breadth to an adult’s right 
to contraceptives because the same privacy concerns were 
                                                
 
61 Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  
62 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977) (“While the contours of this 
historic liberty interest in the context of our federal system of government have not 
been defined precisely, they always have been thought to encompass freedom from 
bodily restraint and punishment.” (footnote omitted)).  
63 Hill, supra note 32, at 1316-17.  
64 Id. at 1303. 
65 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).  
66 Hill, supra note 32, at 1304 (“[I]n In re L., a trial court asserted that a sixteen-year-
old minor had a right to ‘free[dom] from unwanted infringements of bodily integrity’ 
that weighed against her putative father’s request that she undergo a blood test. 
Because the father had sought a court order requiring the test to establish his legal 
paternity, the court took into account the minor’s right to bodily integrity against the 
state. Relatedly, in the case of In re E.G., a state supreme court alluded to the 
possibility that minors have bodily integrity rights with respect to end-of-life care.” 
(citations omitted)). 
67 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); see also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 151 (1976) 
(reaffirming the unconstitutionality of absolute parental veto power over abortions).  
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implicated.68  Underpinning both of these decisions was the idea that 
the State cannot impose its “scheme of values”69 by “prescrib[ing] 
pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child . . . as punishment for 
fornication.”70 
Expanding the minor abortion/contraception right doctrine to 
include other grave interferences with bodily integrity is not difficult, 
especially given the language the Court has used when describing the 
liberty right implicated in the abortion cases.  In Casey, the Court 
clarified that “Roe [v. Wade], however, may be seen not only as an 
exemplar of Griswold [v. Connecticut] liberty but as a rule . . . of 
personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases 
recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical 
treatment or to bar its rejection.”71  This suggests that the liberty right 
should be interpreted broadly to include any medical treatment that 
infringes on a minor’s right to bodily integrity.  
However, despite dicta to the contrary, it is unlikely the Court 
will expand the minor abortion/contraception doctrine to include other 
violations of bodily integrity.  This is because, in the abortion context, 
the Court relies heavily on the concept of maturity.  One scholar 
defines maturity as “[the] foundational concept in all law related to 
children . . . . [a]cross numerous areas of the law—including family 
law, criminal law, labor law, health law, and other areas—when 
children are involved, maturity determinations are pivotal to 
outcomes.”72  In Danforth, the Court emphasized that “our holding . . . 
does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may 
give effective consent for termination of her pregnancy.”73  Similarly, 
the judicial bypass of parental veto power upheld in Bellotti v. Baird 
turned on whether a minor possessed a sufficient level of maturity to 
make an informed decision to terminate pregnancy.74  In contrast, 
although relying heavily on abortion cases, the majority in Carey did 
not rely on maturity and instead looked at the interests at stake 
                                                
 
68 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (“Of particular significance to the decision of this case, 
the right to privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to 
minors as well as to adults.”). 
69 Id. at 695.  
70 Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)).  
71 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992). 
72 Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2012) (citations 
omitted).  
73 Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).  
74 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) (“In this case, we are concerned with a statute directed 
toward minors, as to whom there are unquestionably greater risks of inability to give 
an informed consent.”).  
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regardless of age.75 The Carey approach makes more sense, 
normatively, because it does not make a child’s constitutional rights 
contingent upon an abstract concept of maturity. Otherwise, the 
concept of constitutional rights devolves into a common law concept 
of informed consent. Confusing the latent nature of a child’s 
constitutional rights with the notion that they are not absolute is 
problematic.76  It is critical to realize that the significant consequences 
of a violation of an individual’s bodily integrity are the same 
regardless of age or maturity.77  
As such, it would seem “corrective” intersex surgery would fit 
squarely within a broad definition of the right to bodily integrity. 
Clearly, any decision a parent or medical professional makes about a 
child’s gender identity would severely impair a child’s right to “define 
one’s own concept of existence.”78  Moreover, the sheer invasiveness 
of the procedure—oftentimes not medically necessary—is enough to 
trigger constitutional considerations.79 As discussed, “corrective” 
intersex surgery involves multiple invasive surgeries, potentially 
resulting in painful scarring and sexual dysfunction.80 The procedure 
has even been compared to the trauma of childhood sexual abuse.81  
Although an infant is incapable of making such complex 
medical decisions, allowing a third party (e.g., a parent) to make a 
decision that implicates the right to bodily integrity in such a 
significant way seems contrary to the text of the Due Process Clause 
                                                
 
75 Carey, 431 U.S. at 693.  
76 See Curtis, supra note 51, at 859 (“Children have some rights that cannot be 
exercised until an older age. For instance, all Americans are constitutionally 
guaranteed the right to vote as a method of participating in American democracy, but 
may not do so until the age of 18 . . . . This latent right to vote exists, even though it 
cannot be readily exercised. As another example, a child is not legally competent to 
marry, but the child’s right to choose a spouse upon attaining the age of consent 
cannot be infringed by parents ‘irrevocably [betrothing the child] to someone.’ 
Likewise, parents cannot force a child to marry, even if state law permits the teen to 
marry with parental consent. Similarly, a young child has the right to procreate, even 
though he or she may not yet be physically capable of doing so.” (citations omitted)).  
77 See Hill, supra note 32, at 1314 (“One might argue that pregnant minors are in a 
unique situation in that they are facing a decision with profound long-term effects on 
the minor’s future—a decision that cannot, moreover, be delayed until the minor 
reaches maturity. However, many minors—such as those suffering from terminal 
cancer, drug addiction, or sexually transmitted diseases—are virtually 
indistinguishable from pregnant minors in terms of the gravity of their situations and 
the need for immediate treatment.”).  
78 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  
79 Ford, supra note 20, at 476.  
80 See infra Part I. 
81 Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 70.  
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and surrounding precedent.  Defaulting to parental choice because a 
minor is not mature enough to make this deeply personal and intimate 
decision does not adequately protect the child’s constitutional right to 
bodily integrity.82  
ii.  Procreation  
 Closely related to the right to bodily integrity, the right to 
procreation is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause.  In Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court 
suggested the existence of a right to procreate, stating that “[the State] 
deprives certain individuals of a right which is basic to the 
perpetuation of a race—the right to have offspring.”83 The Court 
further expressed:  
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have 
subtle, farreaching and devastating effects. In 
evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types 
which are inimical to the dominant group to 
wither and disappear. There is no redemption 
for the individual whom the law touches. Any 
experiment which the State conducts is to his 
irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a 
basic liberty.84  
 
This “basic liberty” is afforded to all individuals, presumably children 
and adults alike.85 
 In fact, most jurisdictions require judicial authorization before 
a parent can opt to sterilize his or her child.86  For example, after 
investigating the sterilization of a severely developmentally-disabled 
six-year-old girl, the Washington Protection and Advocacy System 
concluded that a court order was required under Washington state law 
before a sterilization procedure of a minor could commence, and, 
                                                
 
82 Id. at 91 (“Any non-consensual surgery implicates the rights to liberty and bodily 
integrity. This in itself does not disqualify the parents from serving as decision-
makers. However, the particular invasion of this medical intervention is extreme, 
potentially including major reshaping of genitals, removal of orgasmic tissue, 
clitorodectomy, and removal of gonads and other internal organs.” (citations 
omitted)). 
83 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(affirming the right to procreate). 
84 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.  
85 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means 
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).  
86 Uslan, supra note 19, at 310.  
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moreover, that “[c]ourts [also have] limited parental authority to 
consent to other types of medical interventions that are highly invasive 
and/or irreversible, particularly when the interest of the parent may not 
be identical to the interest of the child.”87  Thus, the idea that children 
are afforded the right to procreate is relatively uncontroversial.  
Despite the relatively straightforward precedent, it is unclear 
whether the courts would expand the right to procreate to include the 
right not to be subjected to “corrective” intersex surgery.  As one 
scholar points out, to extend this line of cases to intersex surgery one 
would have to prove that the surgery interfered with the right to 
procreate, not just the quality of his or her sexuality.88  Although there 
is significant evidence that the “corrective” surgery interferes with the 
quality of an individual’s sex life,89 it might be the case that not every 
“corrective” surgery interferes with the fundamental right to procreate. 
Moreover, given the revised AAP-endorsed guidelines emphasizing 
the importance of reproductive function, perhaps, as time goes on, 
fewer procreative rights will be implicated.  However, by removing an 
individual’s reproductive organs, there is a very real possibility that 
the child will be rendered sterile.90  Because the right to procreate is so 
fiercely protected by the Court, it would be contrary to expectations to 
ignore the substantial risk “corrective” intersex surgery poses.  
 
iii.  Application of a Child’s Fundamental Rights in the 
Intersex Context  
A recent case out of the Fourth Circuit illuminates both the 
right to bodily integrity and the right to procreate in the context of 
“corrective” intersex surgery.91  In April 2006, sixteen-month-old 
M.C., who was in the legal custody of the South Carolina Department 
                                                
 
87 Koll, supra note 59, at 233-34 (citing David R. Carlson & Deborah A. Dorfman, 
Investigate Report Regarding the “Ashley Treatment” 1 (Wash. Prot. & Advoc. Sys., 
2007), 
http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Full_Report_Investigati
veReportRegardingtheAshleyTreatment.pdf). 
88 Hermer, supra note 8, at 270. 
89 See id. at 266 (discussing studies that evaluated the sexual problems postoperative 
intersex individuals suffered); Erin Lloyd, From the Hospital to the Courtroom: A 
Statutory Proposal for Recognizing and Protecting the Legal Rights of Intersex 
Children, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 155, 179-80 (2005) (providing anecdotal 
evidence of the sexual dissatisfaction of postoperative intersex individuals). 
90 Joshua C. Albritton, Intersexed and Injured: How M.C. v. Aaronson Breaks 
Federal Ground in Protecting Intersex Children from Unnecessary Genital-
Normalization Surgeries, 24 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 163, 174 (2015).  
91 M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143, 147 (4th Cir. 2015).  
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of Social Services (SCDSS), was subjected to a gender assignment 
surgery.92 M.C. was born intersex and was determined to have 
“‘extremely elevated’ testosterone levels and . . . genitalia consist[ing] 
of a testicle, an ovotestis with ovarian and testicular tissue, a phallus, 
scrotalized labia, a short vagina, and no uterus.”93  Despite the lack of 
medical necessity, doctors elected a “feminizing genitoplasty” and 
removed M.C.’s phallus, testicle, and testicular tissue.94 Although 
originally raised as a girl, as he grew older, M.C. identified himself as 
a male and now currently lives as a boy.95  M.C.’s adoptive parents 
brought suit against the doctors, who performed the surgery, and 
SCDSS for violating M.C.’s constitutional rights.96  Plaintiffs alleged: 
“Defendants’ decision to perform irreversible, invasive, and painful 
sex assignment surgery was unnecessary to M.C.’s medical well-
being.”97  Specifically, Plaintiffs argued that the State violated M.C.’s 
constitutional right to procreate by allowing the doctors to 
“permanently destroy[] M.C.’s potential male reproductive 
function.”98  Plaintiffs further alleged that M.C.’s constitutional right 
to bodily integrity was violated when the decision was made to 
perform highly invasive, medically unnecessary surgery that “deprived 
M.C. of the opportunity to make his own deeply intimate decisions 
about whether to undergo genital surgery.”99  The District Court held 
that M.C. had alleged sufficient facts to survive summary judgment, 
specifically finding that M.C.’s right to procreate was implicated by 
SCDSS’s actions.100  However, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case 
on qualified immunity grounds.101  M.C.’s experience highlights the 
serious constitutional implications of intersex gender assignment 
surgery.  
In sum, it seems the individual’s right to make decisions about 
intersex surgery falls under the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.102  As the Supreme Court notes:  
                                                
 
92 Id. at 145. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 146. 
95 Id.  
96 Complaint at 3, M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143 (4th Cir. 
2015) (No. 2:13-cv-01303-DN) (filed May 14, 2013).  
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Id.  
100 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, M.C. ex rel. Crawford v. 
Amrhein, 598 F. App’x 143 (4th Cir. 2015) (No. 2:13-cv-01303-DCN) (issued Aug. 
29, 2013).  
101 Crawford, 598 F. App’x at 149-50.  
102 Carey v. Population Servs., Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977). 
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While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy 
have not been marked by the Court, it is clear 
that among the decisions that an individual may 
make without unjustified government 
interference are personal decisions “relating to 
marriage . . . procreation . . . contraception . . . 
family relationships, and child rearing and 
education . . . .”103  
 
The choice to undergo intersex surgery involves many, if not all, of 
these concerns.  Despite the strong textual and doctrinal support, it is 
unlikely that any court will apply such a straightforward analysis 
because of the strength of the competing issues at stake.  Instead, a 
balancing of all the interests involved will likely be the methodology 
of choice.  We must thus consider the other actors involved, the parent 
and the State, before coming to any conclusion about the 
constitutionality of “corrective” intersex surgery.  
 
B.  Parental Constitutional Rights  
 Just as the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental 
rights to bodily integrity and procreation, the Due Process Clause also 
“protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”104  This 
Section examines the constitutional right to parent, practical 
considerations of deferring to parents, and whether deference is 
warranted in the “corrective” intersex surgery context.  
 
i. The Right to Parent  
The Court has an extensive history of recognizing the 
fundamental nature of parental control over children and has afforded 
the right to parent broad protections.105  The constitutional right to 
                                                
 
103 Id. (citations omitted).  
104 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
105 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence 
historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with 
broad parental authority over minor children.”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 
232 (1972) (“The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition 
of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary 
role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond 
debate as an enduring American tradition.”); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him 
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 
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parent stems from a concern for family privacy, parental autonomy, 
and self-determination—spheres of liberty where State interference is 
sharply limited.106  While the contours of the right to parent are not 
clearly defined beyond “care, custody, and control,” it has been 
broadly interpreted to a number of things, such as body modification 
and corporal punishment.107  Unquestionably included in the right to 
parent is the parents’ right to make medical decisions on behalf of their 
children, with few limitations.108  
 In addition to having robust constitutional protections, a 
number of practical concerns also motivate courts to defer to parental 
choice. Given that a child may not be competent to make complex 
decisions, the law presumes that a parent will act in the best interests 
of the child.109  It has been suggested that deference to parental 
decisions benefits the parent, child, and society at large.110  Much like 
the constitutional standard, the best interest standard is vague at best. 
In the medical decision-making context, the spectrum of parental 
deference covers everything from medically necessary procedures to 
benign unnecessary surgeries that pose no threat to the child’s 
health.111  For example, the Supreme Court of Oregon upheld the right 
of a father to impose circumcision on his son.112  Similarly, lower 
courts have consistently upheld the ability of parents to consent to 
nontherapeutic operations on behalf of a minor.113  Lower courts have 
                                                                                                               
 
(1923) (“While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus 
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included 
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom 
from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to establish a home and bring 
up children.”).  
106 Alicia Ouellette, Shaping Parental Authority over Children’s Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 
955, 977-78 (2010).  
107 Hill, supra note 32, at 1319.  
108 Rosato, supra note 25, at 5.  
109 Beh & Diamond, supra note 9, at 38-39.  
110 Rosato, supra note 25, at 5. 
111 Ross Povenmire, Do Parents Have the Legal Authority to Consent to the Surgical 
Amputation of Normal, Healthy Tissue from Their Infant Children?: The Practice of 
Circumcision in the United States, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 105-06 
(1999). 
112 In re Marriage of Boldt, 176 P.3d 388, 394 (Or. 2008) (“We conclude that, 
although circumcision is an invasive medical procedure that results in permanent 
physical alteration of a body part and has attendant medical risks, the decision to 
have a male child circumcised for medical or religious reasons is one that is 
commonly and historically made by parents in the United States. We also conclude 
that the decision to circumcise a male child is one that generally falls within a 
custodial parent’s authority.”). 
113 See, e.g., Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (requiring 
parental consent for a skin graft of a fifteen-year-old boy); Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 
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also recognized the right of parents to refuse medical treatment. In 
Newmark v. Williams, after balancing the interests of the child, the 
parents, and the State, the Supreme Court of Delaware permitted three-
year-old Colin’s parents to refuse treatment for Burkitt’s 
Lymphoma.114  A summary of the best interest standard is best 
provided by Anne Tamar-Mattis: “As long as these decisions are in 
line with an accepted medical standard of care, courts will rarely 
intervene in them.”115  
 
ii.  Limitations on the Right to Parent 
Although the spectrum on which parental constitutional rights 
fall is broad, it is not unlimited. The Supreme Court curtailed the right 
to parent when it stated, “[the] rights of parenthood are [not] beyond 
limitation. Acting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, 
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by 
requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor 
and in many other ways.”116  The presence of a conflict of interest, or a 
situation where it cannot be said that the parents’ interests are identical 
to those of the child, may be sufficient to overcome the best interest 
presumption.117 Conflicts of interest often occur when medical 
treatment is unreasonable or particularly extraordinary and when 
countervailing constitutional rights are involved.118  A court may also 
find a conflict of interest when the proposed medical treatment 
provides no medical benefit to the child.119  Two circumstances where 
a court will find in favor of intervention have already been discussed: 
sterilization and organ donation.120  The existence of a conflict of 
interest warrants heightened judicial scrutiny.  
                                                                                                               
 
386 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972) (allowing parents to consent to a kidney transplant from 
one seven-year-old twin to another); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1969) (allowing the mother of a legally incompetent adult to consent to a 
kidney transplant).  
114 Newmark v. Williams/DCPS, 588 A.2d 1108, 1120 (Del. 1991) (“Colin’s best 
interests were served by permitting the Newmarks to retain custody of their child. 
Parents must have the right at some point to reject medical treatment for their 
child.”).  
115 Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 79.  
116 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citations omitted).  
117 See Koll, supra note 59, at 248; Rosato, supra note 25, at 43 (“Although not 
explicitly named, categorical conflicts have been found to exist in types of cases 
where the risk of conflict is so high that court intervention is deemed necessary.”).  
118 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.  
119 Tamar-Mattis, supra note 2, at 94.  
120 Curtis, supra note 51, at 851 (suggesting that these two circumstances implicate 
three major concerns of the court: “(1) the parents’ potential conflict of interest; (2) 
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Moreover, a court will always intervene when the child’s life is 
in danger. The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health when it refused to allow the 
parents to remove their daughter’s artificial feeding and hydration 
equipment absent clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s 
wishes.121  Similarly, although the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
upheld a father’s decision to end life-sustaining treatment for his 
daughter, the court emphasized that his authority did not stem from his 
constitutional right to parent.122 
 
iii. Application of Parental Rights in the Intersex Context 
Clearly, concerns about conflicts of interest are present when a 
parent subjects his or her child to “corrective” intersex surgery. Thus, 
there should be judicial intervention before any procedures are elected. 
In these instances, a parent’s liberty rights come directly into conflict 
with the child’s.  Moreover, some scholars suggest that any 
“corrective” intersex surgery constitutes “unreasonable, extraordinary 
medical intervention[s] that impact significant constitutional interests 
of the child.”123  Deference is unwarranted particularly in the intersex 
context for several reasons, including: (1) the fact that a parent has no 
way of understanding the best interests of a newborn with respect to 
gender identity, and (2) the presumption that familial love 
underpinning the best interest standard may not be complete or present 
when parents are required to make these decisions.124  Drawing on 
bioethicist ideals, others have suggested that conflict exists because 
any intersex procedure irreversibly interferes with a child’s right to an 
open future.125  
While these arguments are compelling, how likely will a court 
curtail parental decision-making powers?  Parents electing to subject 
                                                                                                               
 
the impairment of the child’s fundamental rights; and (3) the lack of medical benefit 
to the child”).  
121 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  
122 In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (N.J. 1976) (“[W]e agree with Judge Muir’s 
conclusion that there is no parental constitutional right that would entitle him to a 
grant of relief . . . . Insofar as a parental right of privacy has been recognized, it has 
been in the context of determining the rearing of infants and, as Judge Muir put it, 
involved ‘continuing life styles.’”). 
123 Hermer, supra note 8, at 267-68 (quoting Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, 
David Reimer’s Legacy: Limiting Parental Discretion, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 
5, 26-27 (2005)).  
124 Lloyd, supra note 88, at 167-69 (citing research suggesting that there is a familial 
parent-child bond that does not always exist, particularly with children who have a 
disability).  
125 Uslan, supra note 19, at 310-11.  
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their child to “corrective” intersex surgery are often well-intentioned 
and rely on the opinions of medical professionals.126  Under these 
circumstances, a court evaluating the best interests of a child may very 
well defer to the parent and doctor.127  In a fundamental rights 
stalemate, it is not hard to imagine the constitutional parental right 
trumping other interests—especially since life or death does not hang 
in the balance.128  Thus, it is necessary to consider the State’s 
intervening interest in “corrective” intersex in order to draw any 
further conclusions.  
C.  The State’s Interest  
 As indicated, the State’s interest in regulating “corrective” 
intersex operations is multifold.  First, the State has a constitutional 
duty not to arbitrarily interfere with an individual’s bodily integrity. 
However, the Court has recognized a number of State interests that 
justify the intrusion, including: “(1) protecting public safety or public 
health; (2) protecting the individual’s own health or safety; (3) 
determining guilt or innocence or searching for evidence of a crime; 
(4) imposing discipline or punishment; and (5) protecting the integrity 
of the medical profession.”129  Second, the State has a constitutional 
duty not to impermissibly interfere with an individual’s right to 
procreate.130 Again, the Court has found exceptions.131  Third, the 
State also may not interfere with a parent’s constitutional right to the 
“care, custody, and control” of their children.132  The exceptions to this 
rule are related to another State responsibility: the duty to safeguard a 
child’s welfare.133  This Section first looks at what State interests 
might justify an interference with a child’s fundamental rights.  This 
Section will then balance those interests against the State’s obligation 
not to interfere with parental rights.  
 
i. State Interests Justifying Interference  
 Typically, for a State to interfere with a fundamental right, the 
intrusion must satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis—the State’s interest 
                                                
 
126 Rosato, supra note 25, at 5. 
127 Id. 
128 Although, one could argue that a “corrective” intersex surgery results in the 
“death” of the child’s gender identity.  
129 Borgmann, supra note 52, at 1067 (citations omitted).  
130 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
131 See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (finding the sterilization of disabled 
women constitutional).  
132 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
133 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (describing the doctrine of 
parens patriae). 
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must be compelling and narrowly-tailored.134  However, in the context 
of a child’s fundamental rights, particularly a child’s right to bodily 
integrity, courts have applied a less stringent tripartite balancing test—
weighing the child’s interest against the interests of the State and the 
parents.135  Even so, the State must have some rational basis for its 
decision to interfere with a child’s fundamental rights.136  This Part 
considers two interests the State might have in allowing infants to be 
subjected to “corrective” intersex surgery: (1) protecting the child 
from social harms, and (2) disgust. Despite these interests, this Part 
concludes by arguing that the State has a stronger interest in 
disallowing the subjection of young children to “corrective” intersex 
surgery.  
a. Stigma  
 The Supreme Court has held that the State has an interest in 
protecting children from social or psychological harm.137  The Court in 
Prince v. Massachusetts held that the State was allowed to protect 
children from “emotional excitement and psychological or physical 
injury” and also stated that parents had no right to make martyrs out of 
their children.138  Similarly, in holding that “separate but equal” 
educational facilities violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education relied 
heavily on social science data when it suggested that “[t]o separate 
[minority children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely 
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status 
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone.”139  More recently, the Supreme Court 
recognized the importance of protecting children from social harms in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.140  In its explanation why the Constitution 
protects the right to marry for same sex-couples, the Court stated:  
Excluding same-sex couples from marriage thus 
conflicts with a central premise of the right to 
marry. Without the recognition, stability, and 
predictability marriage offers, their children 
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60     Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice     [Vol. 5:1 
 
suffer the stigma of knowing their families are 
somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant 
material costs of being raised by unmarried 
parents, relegated through no fault of their own 
to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The 
marriage laws at issue here thus harm and 
humiliate the children of same-sex couples.141  
 
These cases suggest that the State has a significant interest in 
protecting children from stigmatic harm. As such, humiliation, inferior 
treatment, or feeling “less than” are all harms from which the State can 
protect children.142  
Although protecting a child from stigma may be a legitimate, 
or even compelling, State interest—it is limited to protecting a child 
from stigma caused by State action.  The law does not recognize 
private biases as a legitimate source of stigma—thus, it cannot be the 
basis for a law. The Supreme Court in Palmore v. Sidoti foreclosed on 
the possibility of the law giving effect to private biases.143  In Palmore, 
a Florida court found that it was in the child’s best interest to live with 
her father because of the stigmatization the child might be subjected to 
if she lived with her mother, who was married to a man of a different 
race.144  Recognizing the potential “pressures and stresses” of a child 
living with a stepparent of a different race, the Supreme Court 
nonetheless struck down the ruling, concluding that “[t]he Constitution 
cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them. Private 
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly 
or indirectly, give them effect.”145  Thus, while the State has an 
interest in not promoting laws that subject children to stigma, those 
laws also cannot be based on the private biases of society. Although 
under Brown and Obergefell stigma can be constitutionally 
problematic because it is the product of State action, Palmore suggests 
that when the law gives effect to private bias, it perpetuates the stigma 
and, therefore, is equally unconstitutional.146  
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Stigma in the intersex context is problematic. Proponents of 
“corrective” intersex surgery argue that there are a number of “social” 
harms that can result from not performing gender assignment surgery 
at birth.  One argument suggests that a child with ambiguous genitalia 
would be subject to “locker room teasing,” and, as a result, a child 
might suffer from low self-esteem.147  Perhaps more grave, another 
argument suggests that a genderless child living in a gendered society 
might be treated as a second-class citizen, the consequences of which 
could include the “failure of parents to relate to them, alienation from 
society, the perception of embarrassment around the topic of their sex 
or gender, and fragmentation of their family systems.”148  Similarly, 
others have suggested that parents may not bond with or may even 
reject a child with ambiguous genitalia, which would imaginably lead 
to many other negative consequences for the child.149  In short, 
proponents of early “corrective” intersex surgery are concerned the 
child will be stigmatized if he or she has ambiguous genitalia.  
“[S]tigma exists when labeling, negative 
stereotyping, exclusion, discrimination, and low 
status co-occur in a power situation that allows 
these processes to unfold.” Stigma is a 
significant force in most, if not all, societies. It 
may be that issues involving stigma, as much as 
anything else, can explain the reason that the 
parents in the [intersex surgery] study . . . would 
agree to cosmetic genital surgery on their 
daughters even if they knew surgery might 
result in diminished genital sensitivity. Parents 
generally want their children to “fit in.”150  
 
Allowing early surgical intervention, then, will supposedly 
spare intersex children from humiliation and social stigmatization. 
Proponents of surgery point to the anecdotal evidence of adults who 
are satisfied with their gender-assignment and lead normal, healthy 
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lives post-surgery.151 The proponents assert that the psychological and 
cultural benefits of “corrective” intersex surgery outweigh almost any 
medical risk, especially given improved medical technology, which 
may preserve sexual function and fertility.152  Invoking the slippery-
slope argument, proponents suggest that a moratorium on “corrective” 
intersex surgery may prevent parents from consenting to other 
“cosmetic,” non-medically necessary procedures, such as correcting a 
cleft palate or removing facial deformities.153 
 Although a child with ambiguous genitalia might be treated 
differently, this cannot be the basis of State action for two reasons: (1) 
there is not enough evidence to support the conclusion that intersex 
children are subject to stigmatization, and (2) even if there was 
evidence supporting such a conclusion, the law cannot give effect to 
society’s biases.  First, there is very little data concerning how well 
children with ambiguous genitalia interact with their peers, parents, or 
other members of society.154  There is evidence, however, of the 
trauma of multiple “corrective” surgeries.155 The medical procedures 
themselves and their aftermath undermine the very purpose of making 
the child “normal.”156  What’s more, a small study revealed that, 
despite consenting to “corrective” intersex surgery on their infant, 
many parents still did not consider their child to be “normal.”157 
Without stronger evidence demonstrating actual harm to intersex 
children with ambiguous genitalia, any State interest is difficult to 
justify. Second, any statute allowing “corrective” intersex surgery to 
be performed on a child would clearly violate the holding in 
Palmore—the surgery itself is motivated by society’s prejudices.158 
Much like the child in Palmore, intersex children, if stigmatized at all, 
are only stigmatized by society’s private biases, furthered by the 
existence of the gender binary.  
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b.  Disgust  
Closely related to stigma, another possible motivation for State 
interference with a child’s fundamental rights in the intersex context is 
disgust.159  Disgust plays a powerful role in shaping our laws.160 
Disgust “marks out moral matters for which we can have no 
compromise.”161  Justice Scalia invoked disgust in his concurring 
opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., stating:  
Our society prohibits, and all human societies 
have prohibited, certain activities not because 
they harm others but because they are 
considered, in the traditional phrase, “contra 
bonos mores,” i.e., immoral. In American 
society, such prohibitions have included, for 
example, sadomasochism, cockfighting, 
bestiality, suicide, drug use, prostitution, and 
sodomy. While there may be great diversity of 
view on whether various of these prohibitions 
should exist . . . there is no doubt that, absent 
specific constitutional protection for the conduct 
involved, the Constitution does not prohibit 
them simply because they regulate 
“morality.”162  
 
Similarly, the majority in Gonzales v. Carhart relied on disgust when 
it upheld the ban on a particular type of abortion procedure: “The 
Act’s ban on abortions that involve partial delivery of a living fetus 
furthers the Government’s objectives . . . Congress could nonetheless 
conclude that the type of abortion proscribed by the Act requires 
specific regulation because it implicates additional ethical and moral 
concerns that justify a special prohibition.”163  
By allowing infants to be subjected to “corrective” intersex 
surgery, one could argue that the State is motivated by morality or 
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disgust. Disgust for intersexuality can best be explained by Mary 
Douglas’ “matter out of place” theory.164  Disgust is our cultural 
response to “any object or idea likely to confuse or contradict 
cherished classifications.”165  It is a reaction to disorder and an attempt 
to maintain systems and boundaries.166  For example, shoes—not 
inherently disgusting when worn on feet—become dirty when they are 
placed on the dining room table.167  Ambiguity or anomalies are by 
definition unclassifiable—“matter out of place”—and thus elicit a 
strong reaction of disgust.168  For example, Douglas suggests that if 
penguins lived in the Near East during biblical times, they would have 
been labeled “unclean” because they possess both fishlike and birdlike 
characteristics.169  Similarly, syrup is disgusting because it is both a 
liquid and a solid.170  Intersex children—in some sense a “hybrid” of 
both genders—are “matter out of place” and, thus, are marginalized or 
“corrected.”171  The State’s response to children born with ambiguous 
genitalia, essentially recognizing the condition only as a medical 
disorder, is an attempt to reestablish order and maintain boundaries.  
 Interestingly, disgust may also support an argument against 
“corrective” intersex surgery.  The court in Littleton v. Prange, when 
describing the plaintiff’s gender reassignment surgery, suggested the 
surgery “would make most males pale and perspire to contemplate.”172 
Indeed, the specifics of “corrective” intersex surgery may invoke a 
reaction of disgust, much like Congress’s reaction to the abortion 
procedure at issue in Carhart.173  
 Despite the prevalence of disgust in our laws, the State cannot 
use disgust divorced from harms to justify an interference with a 
child’s fundamental rights.  A pure disgust or morality rationale will 
not stand constitutional muster.174  This principle was affirmed by the 
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas: “Moral disapproval of this 
group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is 
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection 
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Clause.”175  Thus, unless the Supreme Court finds some other 
concomitant State interest, moral disapproval of intersexuality will not 
be a sufficient justification for allowing “corrective” intersex surgeries 
to be performed on children.  
 
ii.  State Interests in Protecting Right to Parent  
 As discussed, if a State acts to protect a child’s fundamental 
rights, it is likely that a parent’s fundamental rights will be infringed 
upon.  Thus, the State’s power to intervene is limited to preventing 
abuse, neglect, or other harms to the child.176 In order to exercise its 
parens patriae powers, the State must provide a court with clear and 
convincing evidence that intervention is necessary.177  It has been 
suggested that in instances where competing fundamental rights are at 
stake, the State’s parens patriae powers are at their strongest.178  If 
that is the case, the State should have broad powers to intervene and 
prevent parents from consenting or subjecting their child to 
“corrective” intersex surgery.  Although the right to parent is indeed 
fundamental, the interests at stake for a child—bodily integrity, 
procreation, dignity, and autonomy—are much weightier.  The 
significant challenge the State would face in protecting an intersex 
child’s fundamental rights would be providing clear and convincing 
evidence that “corrective” intersex surgery is actually harmful to the 
child. Given that the data available is chiefly anecdotal, it would be 
difficult to prove that it would be more likely than not that “corrective” 
surgery would harm a child more than postponing the operation or 
doing nothing.  However, given that the surgery often offers no true 
medical benefits, the State could argue that the supposed psychosocial 
benefits of cosmetic gender-assignment surgery are unsupported.  
 
iii.  Application of a State’s Rights in the Intersex Context  
 An interesting comparison between mandatory vaccination 
laws and “corrective” intersex surgery demonstrates the difficulty of 
balancing State interests and competing parental interests.  As 
Professors Chemerinsky and Goodwin explain in depth, compulsory 
vaccination laws are constitutional.179  First, they cite to extensive case 
law recognizing the constitutionality of compulsory vaccination laws. 
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Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that “laws promoting public 
health or safety fall under a state’s police power . . . individual rights 
may need to yield to the state’s police power in order to preserve the 
public health or safety.”180  Second, the professors consider competing 
parental interests—namely freedom of religion and the constitutional 
right to parent—and conclude that neither right is sufficient to 
overcome the State’s interest in protecting the health of minors.181  
 It is unclear which way the compulsory vaccination precedent 
cuts. For example, in Buck v. Bell, the Court cited to the Supreme 
Court’s previous mandatory vaccination holding as support for the 
constitutionality of cutting an institutionalized woman’s fallopian 
tubes.182  Moreover, there is no constitutional case law that specifically 
protects or forbids genital “normalization” surgery.  Therefore, the 
answer turns on whether the State’s interest in protecting a child from 
a non-medically necessary, and highly invasive, surgery is comparable 
to compulsory vaccination.  First, the police power rationale does not 
apply as strongly in the intersex context.  In addition to protecting the 
child from disease, mandatory vaccinations also create “herd 
immunity” and protect the community at large from contracting deadly 
illnesses.183  Whether children are, or are not, subjected to “corrective” 
intersex surgery—they pose no risk to the health of others. Second, as 
discussed earlier, it is hard to say what action is protective of a child’s 
health.  Normatively, it seems clear that removing a child’s healthy 
genital tissue and reproductive organs is not a form of protection. 
Practically, however, without clear guidance suggesting otherwise 
from a doctor or a surgeon assigned to the individual child’s case, 
maybe the State’s interest, or at least the State’s argument, is 
weakened.  This uncertainty perhaps underscores the need for clearer 
and stronger constitutional protections for intersex children.   
 In sum, the State’s strongest interests in allowing “corrective” 
intersex surgeries—protecting the child from psychosocial harms and 
imposing morality—are unsupported and unconstitutional.  Moreover, 
the State’s interest in respecting parental autonomy is limited by the 
potential for grave violations of a child’s fundamental rights.  As such, 
inaction by the State could possibly result in liability for violating a 
child’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.  
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V. PART IV: RECOMMENDATIONS  
 Given the complicated nature of gender, sexuality, and sexual 
orientation, this Article’s recommendation is not a “one-size-fits-all” 
solution.  For example, “corrective” intersex surgery may not 
implicate a child’s fundamental right to procreate in every instance. 
Similarly, the State may have a more compelling interest to intervene 
when such issues are present.  As such, a third-party neutral—such as 
a family court or a special tribunal—should evaluate each case before 
any irreversible medical procedures are performed.  When considering 
whether surgery is appropriate, the intermediary should weigh each of 
the interests discussed above and any particular set of facts that may 
affect the decision.  In many circumstances, foregoing or postponing 
surgery will best protect a child’s fundamental rights.  
 The courts of Colombia provide a model for what an intersex 
tribunal may look like.  In 1995, the Constitutional Court of Colombia 
held that a team of doctors had violated a child’s constitutional right to 
identity when it performed genital normalization surgery on him.184  In 
1999, the Constitutional Court of Colombia limited a child’s parents’ 
ability to consent to genital normalization by creating a heightened 
standard for consent.185  Three months later, the Constitutional Court 
of Colombia clarified the heightened consent standard, explaining that 
it required “[giving parents] detailed information about the advantages 
and disadvantages of surgically altering their child's genitalia, 
[allowing] ample periods of time to consider the alternatives to genital-
normalizing surgery, and [making] decisions in consideration of their 
child's best interests.”186  This standard would be appropriate for 
importation in U.S. courts as it appropriately recognizes the serious 
constitutional implications at stake.  However, while the standard is 
appropriate, I would advocate for mandatory ex ante procedures. The 
child from the 1999 Colombian case was spared irreparable harm 
because the doctors refused to perform surgery without court 
approval—and, ultimately, the Constitutional Court of Colombia 
concluded that the surgery was unconstitutional.187 This should also be 
the standard in the United States.  
 
 
 
                                                
 
184 Ryan L. White, Note, Preferred Private Parts: Importing Intersex Autonomy for 
M.C. v. Aaronson, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 777, 795-96 (2014).  
185 Id. at 797.  
186 Id. at 800-01.  
187 Id. at 798.  
68     Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice     [Vol. 5:1 
 
VI. PART V: CONCLUSION 
  The issues surrounding intersexuality highlight a number of 
broader legal questions, including questions about gender in the law 
and competing liberty interests. For this reason, instead of treating 
genital “normalization” surgery as a purely medical concern, it is 
important to consider all legal ramifications before any action is taken. 
A constitutional floor, bolstered by the State’s interest in protecting 
minors, must be established and recognized in order to adequately 
protect the fundamental rights of intersex children against the 
constitutional rights of their parents.  
 
 
 
 
